How China Is Winning in Latin AmericaXi Jinping gathers assets south of the border while trying to topple the U.S.-led economic system.

By Hernando de Soto

Nov. 18, 2026 12:55 pm ET

President James Monroe introduced his well-known doctrine in 1823 to protect the Americas from European states that wanted to recolonize the New World and exercise sovereign rights over minerals, land, roads, ports and safe passage—what are today called real-world assets, or RWAs.It was a geopolitical problem: The British torched the U.S. Congress in 1814, the Spanish invaded Tampico, Mexico,

in 1829, and the French bombarded Vuelta de Obligado in Argentina in 1845, all to achieve various political and economic ends.Today, Xi Jinping covets many of the same RWAs in Latin America and is displacing the U.S. in developing them. Not surprisingly, many Americans consider China’s growing footprint in the hemisphere a geopolitical problem.But Mr. Xi’s ambitions go beyond geopolitics. He is attempting a foundational disruption that begins by outowning and outcapitalizing the U.S. in Latin America.

The end goal—achieved by employing the same digital tools and financial arrangements Americans use, from legal disclosures to securities and tokenization, though under different names—is a steady metamorphosis of global capitalism.Communists have tried for nearly 200 years to abolish and replace global capitalism—from Western Europe to Lenin’s Russia, Stalin’s Soviet Union, Castro’s Cuba and Mao’s peasant revolution.

Beginning in the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatism opened the way for modernization through “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” More recently, Mr. Xi concluded it was impossible to kill the beast; the solution was to ride it.On the basis of what Mr. Xi calls his “Autonomous Knowledge System,” he has reinvented investment-capital formation based on Marx’s historical materialism, which claims that the foundation of political power is the control of material assets. In Latin America, Mr. Xi begins by acquiring illiquid ownership rights to RWAs.

To understand how this leads to liquid capital, keep in mind that Latin America lacks the elaborate common-law infrastructure that shapes and restricts business development in the U.S. Picture instead a chaotic, largely informal system in which ownership rights and financial assets can be moved around and recombined until the optimal surplus value of different arrangements can be discovered, codified and transferred. These transactions create a closed-loop value chain that identifies how surpluses can be realized and reinvested in more RWAs.

Thus, a mining or port concession isn’t a stand-alone profit center. It serves as the raw material anchor for a state-constructed process that generates for China massive domestic investment capital and strategic industrial dominance.To obtain the knowledge needed to make an ownership claim stick on the ground in Latin America, Mr. Xi’s project—often called the New Silk Road or Belt and Road Initiative—doesn’t focus only on sovereign concessions and private-property deeds, but on countless local records as well as international conventions, jurisprudence and bilateral treaties. These give Mr. Xi the knowledge and tools to own RWAs.

They can also serve as stepping stones for China to gain supremacy in emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology and clean energy, and to set the global standards and rules needed to build the “central control panel” for worldwide data governance.The bottom line: Seen from darkest Peru, what Mr. Xi is doing in Latin America is changing the substance of RWAs by giving them more useful and trustworthy forms. This process isn’t about which factors drive the status of RWAs—labor, government planning, price signals—but about changing RWAs’ form and direction to create real wealth. It is probably one of the oldest processes created by mankind. Mr. Xi didn’t invent it. What he has done is use Western tools packaged with Chinese characteristics to make them more effective.It is probably what Adam Smith pointed to when he said that to create wealth we needed “a sort of wagon-way through the air”; what Hayek described as the relationship between capital and assets, which results in a knowledge that surpasses human understanding; what Karl Marx described as the process that changes a commodity into “something transcendent”; and what Thomas Jefferson said—almost half a century before Marx—was the knowledge the U.S. was missing so that banks would stop producing “fictitious capital.”For us Latin Americans, it is further confirmation that our poverty is due to a lack of legal and financial forms, not a lack of real-world assets, and that the way out is to plug into those wealthy countries where the rules and tools for wealth creation can be found.

This leads to three recommendations for our American friends:First, keep in mind that after communism collapsed in the 1990s, there was only one game in town, but now we’re back to two games.Second, understand that the West stopped thinking about ownership and capital formation as strategic instruments—treating messy ownership systems and a lack of capital as settled background conditions—while China took property and capital seriously as global statecraft and caught the West flatfooted.Third, if the U.S. wants to compete with China, it needs to engage with those Americans who are bringing RWAs back to center stage—like Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Paul Atkins—as well as the Silicon Valley innovators who are building the blockchain engineering rails to carry them.America has talent but lacks a way to deploy it to the front line. If the U.S. wants to answer China’s challenge, it needs to rally this talent and formulate a response.Mr. de Soto is author of “The Mystery of Capital” and a former CEO of UEC, Switzerland’s largest consulting engineering firm.

Fuente: https://www.wsj.com/opinion/how-china-is-winning-in-latin-america-e6a99fec?st=xHpv2k&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink